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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the implications of increasing globalisation of stock market ownership on the economics
of protection. Current data on European, Japanese and Australian stock exchanges indicate that in most cases
over 30 per cent of the stock market is foreign-owned, a large increase on a couple of decades ago. Foreign share
ownership in the USA lags behind these levels, but is increasing fast. This degree of foreign share-ownership is
likely to change qualitatively the nature of the response of governments to FDI and support for domesticrms. In
particular, a series worked examples, based upon duopoly theory, suggest that the level of foreign share-ownership
is usually su¢ cient for prot-shifting on its own no longer to justify protection .
JEL Classications: F10, F12.
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In this paper, I examine the implications of increasing globalisation of share ownership on the economics of pro-
tection. In particular, I examine the argument traditionally made for such protection on the basis of a prot-shifting
motive. If proper account is taken account of the foreign ownership share of national champions, the prot-shifting
arguments in favour of protecting such rms are greatly reduced. Current data on European stock exchanges indicate
that over 30 per cent of the stock market is foreign-owned in teh majority of countries, a large increase on a couple of
decades ago.
The issue which I address is whether this degree of foreign share-ownership is likely to change qualitatively the
nature of the response of governments to FDI and support for domesticrms. In particular, I use a series of worked
examples, based upon duopoly theory using both linear and isoelastic demand specications. In most cases, the level
of foreign share-ownership is now su¢ cient to render protection unattractive.
1 Prot shifting and protection
Much of the literature on strategic trade policy is reviewed in Brander (1995). Models such as the Brander (1981),
Brander and Spencer (1985) or Eaton and Grossman (1986) assume that one rm in a duopoly is domestically-owned,
while the other is foreign owned. The government therefore has an incentive to intervene, via subsidies or other policies,
to favour its own national company. The key motive is prot-shifting: if a market is imperfectly competitive, then
rms will charge a prot markup  over marginal cost, where  is typically expected to be close to 1=("  1), where "
is the rms perceived own-price demand elasticity, based upon its conjectures of rival rmsbehaviour. Therefore, if
marginal costs are constant, prots will account for proportion =(1 + ) of total turnover. A policy such as a tari¤
or quota or subsidy, or the use of regulations to keep a foreign entrant out, would be expected to worsen consumer
welfare: however, if the share of prots in output, =(1 + ); is su¢ ciently large, and if the policy raises the domestic
rmsshare of those prots by a su¢ cient amount, then the policy may benet national welfare at the margin (at the
expense of foreigners). Prot-shifting is frequently cited as a motivation for the government intervention in a number
of industries, such as civil aircraft manufacturing.1
The impact of foreign share ownership on these prot-shifting duopoly models2 was examined in a series of papers
around 1990. Lee (1989) examines in theoretical terms a Cournot setup in a two-country world, where only one country
(1) consumes the good in question. A home rm based in country 1 competes with imports from a rival in country 2.
1See Pavcnik, 2002.
2The great majority of studies of prot-shifting have concentrated on duopoly, probably because the impact of prot-shifting on policy
is likely to be greater in the presence of just two competing rms, rather than more rms, where prots will be lower.
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An increase in the proportion of the rm in country 2 owned by inhabitants of 1 and vice-versa is shown to lower the
optimal export subsidy and import tari¤ at the same rate. He then derives the critical values of home share-ownership
and ownership abroad where export subsidies and/or import taxes become negative. These values are fairly specic
to the case where there are just two countries in the World: in practice, many shares may be owned by third-party
nationals.
Dick (1993) examines a model, following Brander and Spencer (1985), where two rms of di¤erent nationality
compete in a third countrys market. Again this is examined in the context of Cournot competition with a linear
demand function. On data for the United States from the US Department of Commerce (1990), where an average of
14% of US industry was owned by foreigners3 , while 3.36% of non-US industry was owned by Americans, he estimated
that the average optimal export subsidy would be reduced by 47% relative to the Brander-Spencer value.
In this paper, I suggest that even Dicks (1993) paper underestimates the di¤erence international share ownership
would make in many countries today. This is both because many countries have far more internationalised equity
markets than the United States, and also because the degree of international share-ownership has grown hugely over
the last 15 years. In the classic linear Cournot setup of two rms competing for a third-country market, international
share-ownership in most cases now exceeds the critical levels where any (nonnegative) level of export subsidy is optimal.
I then extend this analysis to the isoelastic demand version of the model, where threshold values have not previously
been derived, and look in more detail at scenarios of protection in an importing country. In particular, I go beyond
tari¤-setting (which is often ruled out in practice by international agreements), and look at regulatory protection
and the exclusion of foreign competitors to national champions. In all these scenarios, I nd a signicant e¤ect of
international share-ownership: in most cases, prot-shifting is unlikely to be su¢ cient to justify protectionism.
It should be noted that there are other possible reasons for protecting a domestic rm, apart from prot-shifting.
These include exploitation of static and dynamic scale economies or spillovers, distributional factors, the desirability of
maintaining domestic head-o¢ ce capability, the supposed greater accountability of local rms to local regulators etc.
Nevertheless, I largely concentrate in this paper on cases where prot shifting is the primary motive for protection.
3These estimates were based upon FDI data for 1986. Much of the portfolio ownership of stock markets covered in the FESE data is
additional to direct ownership of domestic rms by foreigners, and so, in one sense, FDI-based numbers are almost certainly an underestimate
of the true position of international equity ownership.
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2 Internationalisation of Share Ownership
A key feature of the early papers on prot-shifting (i.e. prior to Lee, 1989) is that rms can easily be classied
according to their nationality: in other words, they assume 100% of shares in the domestic rm(s) are owned by
domestic nationals, and 100% of shares in foreign rms are owned by foreigners. While this may be the case when a
rm is nationalised, or where it is a private or family-owned company, it is unlikely to be the case with most public
limited companies.4 We can split shares into those owned directly by the state (proportion s), those directly owned by
foreigners, proportion ; those owned by other rms and nancial institutions based in the domestic country quoted on
the stock market, proportion m and those directly owned by pension funds and the like, proportion p = 1 s  m: If
the rate of corporate taxation is t, then a lower bound estimate for the share of prots of domestically-based companies
(net of tax) which actually ends up accruing to foreigners is
L = : (1)
However, if many of the other rms and nancial institutions who own shares within the country are themselves partly
foreign-owned, then a higher estimate of the proportion of prots which actually ends up in companieshands is the
solution to a geometric progression, which yields:
H = =(1 m): (2)
Taking the examples of Germany, France, the UK and Italy in 2003 the structure of share ownership, as quoted by
FESE, is shown in Appendix Table 1. In the case of Italy, our lower-bound estimate for foreign ownership would be
L = 14:4% in 2003, while the higher estimate would be just over 28% of the total. Most other European countries
are considerably more internationalised still, as Appendix Table 2 shows. In this table, in most countries at least 1=3
of shares are now foreign-owned, and the true gure may well be over 50% in most cases.
Data is missing for many European countries prior to 1995, and foreign shareowning uctuates over time. However,
Figure 1, below, shows that in a number of countries for which long time-series are available, the upward trend, decade-
on-decade, is remarkable. For example, direct foreign share ownership in the UK rose from around 8% in 1985 to a
third today.
4Recent papers arguing that the denition of national champions, at least in Europe, is getting increasingly blurred include Edwards
and Gros (2006) and Veron (2006).
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Figure 1
Comparable data on foreign equity ownership in the United States is relatively hard to come by. Bertaut et al
(2006) estimate foreigners owned 10 per cent of U.S. equity in June 2005 - an increase from 5 per cent in 1994 - though
their paper outlines a number of data issues. This number almost certainly excludes cases of wholly foreign-owned
subsidiaries, which is why it does not tally easily with the FDI-based estimates used by Dick (1993).
Since  is the share of post-tax prots which accrue to foreigners, we also need to correct for corporate taxation.
From Devereux and Gri¢ ths database5 I use estimates of the e¤ective average tax rate in 2005, adjusted for time-
and country-specic ination. These tax rates range from just under 20% to just over 30% in the selected sample of
countries. When adjustment is made for this, then, for those countries on which tax and stock market ownership data
is available, the lower estimate of the share of prots accruing to foreigners ranges from 10.8% in Italy to 52.4% in the
Netherlands, while the higher estimate ranges from 21% in Italy to 63.7% in the Netherlands.
5Available on http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210. Details of the methodology are given in Devereux et al
(2002).
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3 Implications of foreign share ownership for protectionist policies: ex-
port subsidies with a duopoly
The rst example I choose to look at is the classic case of duopolists from two countries selling into a third country
market. This is an issue given some prominence by the classic paper of Brander and Spencer (1985), and, while the
analysis is simplied, is widely regarded as having some relevance to real policy issues - notably the Boeing/Airbus
dispute. This essentially looks at a two-stage game between the two rms and the two governments of their home
countries. Following a standard model formulation, I assume that the rms have identical costs and make indistin-
guishable products, and compete for the third country market in a subgame on the basis of Cournot conjectures about
each others output. The two exporting country governments, however, both have a potential motive to intervene in
the export market, each subsidising itsrms exports, with the intention of gaining a larger share of the market and
hence a greater share of combined prots, which are supranormal because of the duopoly. In this higher-level game,
each of the two governments is assumed to form a xed conjecture of the others likely subsidy level.
I assume initially that each country is small relative to the global nancial economy, even though they are large
relative to this particular industry. Consequently, while proportion  of country 1s industry is owned by foreign-
ers,country 1s ownership of shares in any one foreign country, 2, is assumed to be negligible. The e¤ects of relaxing
this assumption are discussed later in the paper. I also concentrate on the case where there are constant returns to
scale.6
This problem has been solved in the linear demand case7 by Dick (1993) and Neary (1994),8 with the result that,
regardless of scale or cost asymmetries, the Brander-Spencer argument for subsidy always breaks down when the share
of foreign ownership,  = 1=4: Nevertheless, for comparison with the isoelastic demand case below, I lay out the main
properties of the linear model (in the symmetric case) below, where the rms are denoted 1 and 2, and we are interested
in the welfare e¤ects of a subsidy S in country 1.
6Dick (1993) and Neary (1992) extend their models to increasing returns. However, as I want to focus solely on the prot-shifting motive
in this paper (rather than infant industry type arguments), I concentrate on constant returns cases.
7Strictly speaking, both the linear demand model and the constant elasticity demand model are special cases, although in both cases
it is possible to investigate a wide range of parameterisations by altering A and b, or  and  respectively. Both models are qualitatively
di¤erent, as Proposition 1 shows. Linear models tend to be favoured by many oligopoly theorists, due to ease of solution, although the
constant elasticity model is more consistent with the functional forms used in most general equilibrium trade models.
8Footnote 2 of Nearys paper. Neary treats foreign ownership of shares in a domestic rm as being equivalent to a higher local cost.
Consequently, the result in a linear Cournot model that a country will cease to subsidise its exports if its costs are more than 4=3 those of
the foreign rm is equivalent to saying that the critical threshold of foreign ownership is 1=4. In a general functional form, Neary shows that
a country will not subsidise its exports if its producers costs exceed double those of the foreign competitor: this is presumably equivalent
to a situation where 50% of the domestic rm is foreign-owned. Neary does not specically solve the constant elasticity case.
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Linear Cournot Duopoly
Inverse demand (a1) P = A  b(D1 +D2):
Marginal cost (a2) C   S for rm 1 and C for rm 2:
Marginal revenue rm 1 (a3) MR1 = @R1=@D1 = A  2bD1   bD2:
Equilibrium output: rm 1 (a4) D1 = (A  C + 2S)=3b:
Equilibrium output: rm 2 (a5) D2 = (A  C   S)=3b:
Equilibrium price (a6) P = (A+ 2C   S)=3:
Prot rm 1 (a7) 1 = (A  C + 2S)2=9b:
Country 1s welfare (a8) W1 = (1  )1   (A  C + 2S)S=3b:
Marginal welfare e¤ect of S (a9) @W1=@S = 4(1  )(A  C + 2S)=9b  (A  C + 2S)=3b  2S=3b:
The threshold value of foreign ownership,  = e, is satised by  = 1=4, as in the earlier papers.
As an alternative, however, it is worth comparing the result for an isoelastic demand model. This derives from a
utility function
U = D; (3)
where D = D1 +D2, and 0 <  < 1: This generates an own-price elasticity of
" = 1=(   1)
for the combined output.
In a symmetric equilibrium, subsidies in the two countries are equal, so S1 = S2 = S. This can be summarised as
follows, setting cost equal to 1  Si (without loss of generality):
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Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand Two rms exporting to a third country
Inverse demand (b1) P = (D1 +D2) 1:
Marginal cost (b2) MC = 1  S1 for rm 1, 1  S2 for rm 2.
Combined demand (b3) DC = D1 +D2 = [(MC1 +MC2)=((1 + ))]1= 1:
Relative shares (b4)  = D2=D1 = (MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1):
Price in a symmetric equilibrium (b5) P = 2(1  S)=(1 + ):
Firm 1s demand (b6) D1 = (P=)1=( 1)=2:
Marg e¤ect of S1 on relative shares (b7) @
c=dS1 =  ((1 + )=((1  )(1  S)):
Marg e¤ect on combined demand (b8) @Dc=@S1 = (4=(1  )(1 + ))(D1=P ):
Marg e¤ect on rm 1s demand (b9) @D1=@S1 = (1=2)[(@Dc=@S1) D1(@c=dS1)]:
Marg e¤ect of S1 on price (b10) @P=@S1 =  1=(1 + ):
Total welfare in country 1 (b11) W1 = D1((1  )(P   1)  S1)
Marg e¤ect of S1 on W1; (b12) @W1=@S1 = ((1  )(P   1)  S)(@D1=@S1)
+(1  )D1(@P=@S1)  D1:
The solution is the value of  = e for which @W1=@S1 = 0 when S = 0. By substitution, it can be shown that
this is satised by  = 1=3:
Proposition .1 In a scenario of two identical producers from di¤erent nations acting as a Cournot duopoly in a third
country, where marginal costs are constant and the demand elasticity is constant, the Nash equilibrium subsidy level for
the two governments will equal zero when foreign ownership of shares is 1/3 of the total. This compares to a threshold
value of foreign ownership of 1/4 in a Cournot duopoly when demand is linear.
Proof of Proposition 1
The linear case has been proven before in Dick (1993) and Neary (1994), and can be generalised to asymmetric
cost functions. As a check, the condition is that @W1=@S = 0 when S = 0: this is found by setting
@W1=@S = 4(1  )(A  C + 2S)=9b  (A  C + 2S)=3b+ 2S=3b = 0: (4)
I then set S = 0, so
@W1=@S = 4(1  e)(A  C)=9b  (A  C)=3b = 0 ==> e = 1=4: (4a)
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For the isoelastic demand case, we want to solve the set of equations above to nd the value of  = , which gives
S = 0. Consequently, we substitute for S = 0 in @W1=@S1.
@W1=@S1 = ((1  )(P   1)  S)(@D1=@S1) + (1  )D1@P=@S1   D1 = 0;
Substituting into this equation for P ; D1; @D1=@S1 and @P=@S==>
1 +  = 3(1 + );
 = 1=3: (5)
Q.E.D.
It is worth noting that both critical values are probably now below the average level of foreign share ownership
reported on most European stock markets at present.
4 Entry of a Foreign Competitor to a Domestic Monopolist
I now widen the discussion to models of entry or exit of a foreign rm to compete with a domestic monopolist. This can
take a number of forms depending on the nature of the industry: in some cases, the good is internationally tradable,
in which case the question is the setting of tari¤s and/or non-tari¤ barriers to exclude the foreign rm. In the case of
tari¤s, the setup is essentially an extension of Brander and Spencer (1981), allowing for entry of the foreign rm.
Alternatively, the good or service concerned may not be easily tradable, but the government of the host country
may be contemplating whether or not to allow entry of a foreign rm to challenge a national champion. This example
could be seen as a case of economic patriotism:9 a loosely-dened term, which appears to be mostly concerned with
preventing foreign entry into strategic industries and takeover of national championcompanies. In some service
industries, such as privatised utilities, the only way to enter is by FDI.
9See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4837150.stm , which refers to the De Villepin government in France and its
economic patriotismagenda. Also Gros, 2006.
9
4.1 The linear Cournot duopoly
I will start by examining the prot-shifting motive for protection in the case of a linear, Cournot duopoly. We should
note in passing that, in the case of protecting a local champion against a potential importer, a countrys preferred
method of protection, ceteris paribus, would be tari¤s, which raise revenue. However, due to issues of the visibility of
tari¤s, advanced countries generally resort to regulatory protection instead. I summarise both cases here. The model,
which is summarised in Edwards (2007), assumes that the two rms have unit costs C1 and C2, but that rm 2, which
is foreign, faces an additional iceberg cost per unit,  ; to overcome regulatory barriers to entering the market. These
regulations are assumed to be of the pure, horizontal variety (i.e. they do not add to welfare in the importing country).
The model can be summarised as follows:
Linear Cournot duopoly with regulatory barrier  and tari¤ t on the foreign rm
Inverse demand (c1) P = A  b(D1 +D2):
Firm 1 marg cost (c2) C1:
Firm 2 marg cost (c3) C2 + t+  :
Marginal revenue rm 1 (c4) MR1 = A  2bD1   bD2 : Firm 2 is equivalent
Equilibrium output rm 1 (c5) D1 = (A  2C1 + C2 + t+ )=3b:
Equilibrium output rm 2 (c6) D2 = (A+ C1   2C2   2t  2)=3b:
Equilibrium price (c7) P = (A+ C1 + C2 + t+ )=3:
Firm 1 prots (c8) 1 = (A  2C1 + C2 + t+ )2=9b:
Consumer surplus (c9) V = (2A  C1   C2   t  )2=18b:
Tari¤ revenue (c10) T = t(A+ C1   2C2   2t  2)=3b:
Marg e¤ect of  or t on 1 (c11) @1=@ = @1=@t = 2(A  2C1 + C2 + t+ )=9b:
Marg e¤ect of  or t on V (c12) @V=@ = @V=@t =  (2A  C1   C2   t  )=9b:
Marg e¤ect of t on tari¤ revenue (c13) @T=@t = (A+ C1   2C2   4t  2)=3b:
Welfare in country 1 (c14) W1 = (1  )1 + V + T:
Marg e¤ect of  on W1 (c15) @W1=@ = (C2   C1 + t+ )=3b  2(A  2C1 + C2 + t+ )=9b:
Marg e¤ect of t on W1 (c16) @W1=@t = (A  C2   3t  )=3b  2(A  2C1 + C2 + t+ )=9b:
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4.1.1 Setting of tari¤s
Edwards (2007) discusses the interaction of tari¤s and non-tari¤ barriers in this model. If the home country is free
to set tari¤s, then it will never use non-tari¤ barriers (quotas or horizontal regulatory barriers) to exclude the foreign
rm, since the latter yield no revenue. Consequently, we can assume  = 0: It follows that
@W1=@t = (A  C2   3t)=3b  2(A  2C1 + C2 + t)=9b:
Setting this equal to zero gives us a relationship between  and the welfare-maximising tari¤, t.
@W1=@t = 0 ==> (3  2)(A  C2) + 4(C1   C2) = (2+ 9)t;
t = [(3  2)(A  C2) + 4(C1   C2)]=(2+ 9): (6)
Note rst that, where C1 = C2 = C, we can derive
t = (3  2)(A  C)=(2+ 9): (7)
From this follows
Lemma .1 When there is no foreign ownership, the welfare-maximising tari¤ for country 1 is (A  C)=3:
Lemma .2 When there is total foreign ownership, the welfare-maximising tari¤ for country 1 is (A  C)=7:
Both lemmas follow from substituting  = 0 or  = 1 in equation (6). Also note that, given foreign ownership
always lies between 0 and 100%.
Lemma .3 The welfare-maximising tari¤ declines monotonically as foreign ownership increases.
This follows from di¤erentiating (7) with respect to  and rearranging:
@t=@ =  2t=(3  2)  2t=(2+ 9): (8)
Since 0 6  6 1; this will be negative.
From these lemmas follows
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Proposition .2 In a symmetric, linear Cournot model, where the two rms have identical costs (before including the
tari¤ ) the welfare-maximising tari¤, t; will always be positive, even if foreign ownership is 100 %.
From inspection of (6), we can see that the welfare-maximising tari¤will be lower if the foreign rm is the lower-cost
producer. For a given value of C1, @t=@C2 < 0: Alternatively, setting t = 0; (6) can be rewritten as
 = (3  2)=2: (9)
where
 = (C2   C1)=(A  C1):
From this we can derive that, when foreign ownership is 100%, t falls to zero when  = 1=2; but that, even when
foreign ownership is 75%, C2 must already be higher than the demand intercept A.
An intuitive explanation why tari¤-setting is less a¤ected by the foreign ownership of local rms than in the other
scenarios examined in this paper is that tari¤s are justied, at least partly, by extraction of producer rent from foreign
rms in the form of tari¤ revenue, rather than simply by prot-shifting.
4.1.2 Regulatory protection
Tari¤s are often ruled out by international agreements, or are seen as too visible. Consequently, it is widely argued10
that countries will resort to regulatory protection to keep foreign rms out. Edwards (2007) looks at the use of pure,
horizontal regulatory protection in a linear model, and shows that it is quite di¤erent in its implications to the situation
where the home country is free to apply tari¤s.
Throughout this subsection, I consider the properties of the linear Cournot duopoly model, when t is constrained
to equal zero. First, consider the situation when  = 0:
Lemma .4 When there is no foreign-ownership of rm 1, then welfare in country 1 is initially increasing with respect
to the regulatory barrier,  ; unless C2 is less than C1.
This lemma is proven by setting  = 0; so that @W 1 =@ = (C2   C1 + )=3b:
Also
10See Maskus and Wilson (2000).
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Lemma .5 When there is no foreign ownership, the marginal gain to country 1 from increasing the regulatory barrier,
 ; is monotonically increasing with respect to  :
This follows from setting  = 0, and di¤erentiating @W 1 =@ again with respect to  :
From these two lemmas follows the proposition:
Proposition .3 In a linear Cournot duopoly, in the absence of foreign ownership, and when tari¤s are ruled out,
country 1 will prefer to raise the regulatory barrier to the point where the foreign rm is totally excluded, unless C1 is
su¢ ciently larger than C2.
The logic behind this proposition is that Lemma 4 shows that, starting from zero protection, the initial marginal
welfare e¤ect of raising  is positive, while Lemma 5 shows that subsequent increases in  produce still larger welfare
gains, until the foreign rm is driven out completely.
Edwards (2007) shows that su¢ ciently largerin this case means
jC1   C2j < jA  C1j =2: (10)
We now want to ask whether, and how, this total exclusion result is changed when there is some foreign ownership
of rm 1. Doubly di¤erentiating W1 with respect to  ; we nd that
@W1=@ = (C2   C1 + )=3b  2(A  2C1 + C2 + )=9b; (11)
@2W1=@
2 = (3  2)=9b: (11a)
For a given value of  between 0 and 1, @2W1=@2 is constant and positive. There will only be one turning-point for
W1 with respect to  ; and this will be a minimum. Looking at the range of  from 0 up to the point where the foreign
rm is excluded, the optimal value of  will not be an interior point (since there is only one turning-point, which is a
minimum, not a maximum). There follows
Lemma .6 When foreign ownership is introduced in the linear Cournot model, and protection takes the form of
horizontal regulatory protection, the importing country governments preferred solution will be either no protection or
total exclusion of the foreign rm.
To see which solution will be preferred, it is also necessary to compare the solution with that of a monopoly, where
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the foreign rm has been totally excluded from the market.
Monopoly Duopoly
Inverse demand (d  e1) P = A  bD1: P = A  b(D1 +D2):
Marginal cost (d  e2) MC = C1: MC = C1 or C2
Output rm 1 (d  e3) D1M = (A  C1)=2b: D1D = (A  2C1 + C2)=3b
Output rm 2 (d  e4) D2D = (A+ C1   2C2)=3b
Price (d  e5) PM = (A+ C1)=2: PD = (A+ C1 + C2)=3:
Prot rm 1 (d  e6) 1M = (A  C1)2=4b: 1D = (A  2C1 + C2)2=9b
Consumer surplus (d  e7) VM = (A  C1)2=8b: VD = (2A  C1   C2)2=18b:
Welfare (d  e8) W1M = (3  2)(A  C1)2=8b: W1D = [2(1  )(A  2C1 + C2)2
+(2A  C1   C2)2]=18b:
From the above, we can deduce that,
Proposition .4 In a linear Cournot model, when costs are symmetric between the two rms, the importing countrys
government will prefer to exclude the foreign rm if and only if foreign ownership of its domestic rm is less than
thirty per cent.
Proof of Proposition 4
Note that
W 1M = (3  2)(A  C1)2=8b; (12)
W 1D = (3  )(A  C1)2=9b; (13)
where the asterisk indicates the situation where costs of the two rms are equal. The value of  = b; which equates
W 1M with W

1D, is found by rearranging these equations:
(3  2b)=8 = (3  b)=9;
b = 3=10: (14)
Q.E.D.
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The 30% threshold in Proposition 4 is interesting as, once again, it lies below the current levels of foreign ownership
in many countries, whereas a decade ago this was not the case.
It is also interesting to see how this is altered in the case of di¤erential costs for the two rms. Given the relative
complexity of the equations, a numerical solution method is applied, as shown in Table 3, below.
C2=C1
A=C1 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
1.5 0.00 0.07 0.3 0.47 0.59
2 0.07 0.2 0.3 0.39 0.47
2.5 0.16 0.23 0.3 0.36 0.42
3 0.20 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.39
3.5 0.22 0.26 0.3 0.34 0.37
4 0.23 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.36
4.5 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.33 0.35
5 0.25 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.35
Table 3: Critical foreign ownership share for excluding a foreign competitor to a domestic monopolist: linear
demand.
In the calculations, I have set C1 = 1, without loss of generality. The gure shows that, whenever production
costs are equal (C2 = C1 = 1), the critical value of  is 0:3, as in Proposition 4. However, when the foreign rms
costs are lower than the domestic rm, the critical threshold value of  is lower, so that only with very low levels of
foreign ownership will the home country choose to exclude the foreign rm. This is particularly true when the demand
intercept, A, is relatively low. By contrast, if the foreign rm has much higher costs than the domestic rm, the home
country may prefer to exclude it even when a higher proportion of its domestic rm is foreign-owned.
4.2 A Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand
Again, I will concentrate on the case where a foreign rm seeks - maybe as part of a general industry deregulation
- to move in to challenge a local monopolist. Given that this is a complicated model to solve, I will concentrate on
the case where costs of the two rms are symmetric (normalised at $1 per unit) and where the governments choice is
simply one of excluding the foreign rm totally or allowing it to enter.11
11This might correspond to allowing a foreign competitor to challenge a local, privatised utility.
15
The choice facing the government of the host country is therefore whether to persist with a protected monopoly (I
assume there is no price regulation) or to allow the foreign rm to enter and create a duopoly. In the latter situation,
prices will be lower and output higher, so beneting consumers. Half of the duopoly prots, however, will be sent
abroad. The foreign rm is entirely foreign-owned, whereas share (1   ) of the domestic rm is owned by domestic
residents. I will ignore prot taxes in this simple analysis, though they serve, in practice, to reduce :
Consumers have a utility function as in (3) above. The outcomes under a monopoly and a symmetric Cournot
duopoly are:
Isoelastic demand Monopoly Symmetric Cournot Duopoly
Inverse demand (f=g1) P = D 1: (D1C +D2C) 1
Marginal cost to rm 1 (f=g2) MC = 1: MC = 1:
Marginal cost to rm 2 (f=g3) : MC = 1:
Output rm 1 (f=g4) DM = (2)1=1  D1C = ((1 + )=2)1=(1 )=2:
Output rm 2 (f=g5) D2C = ((1 + )=2)1=(1 )=2:
Price (f=g6) PM = 1=: PC = 2=(1 + ):
Prot rm 1 (f=g7) M = (2)1=1 ((1  )=): 1C = (((1 + )=2)1=(1 )   1)(2=(1 + )):
Consumer surplus (f=g8) VM = (2)=1 (1  2): VC = ((1 + )=2)=(1 )
(1  ((1 + )=2))(2=(1 + )):
Welfare (f=g9) (1  )M + VM : (1  )M + VM :
Solution and comparison Rather than solving these two models algebraically, it is more sensible in this case to
carry out a numerical simulation for each model, based upon alternative values of " and . The scale parameter, ;
can be shown to have no e¤ect on whether the country will prefer a protected monopoly or a duopoly.
In general, the more elastic demand is (the higher " or the lower  is), the more likely, other things equal, a country
will prefer economic patriotism. This is because the costs of monopoly, in terms of loss of consumer surplus, are less
when demand is elastic. There is therefore a critical threshold elasticity, ", above which the country will prefer a
domestic monopoly to a half-foreign duopoly. Simulations show that, when there is no foreign share-ownership in the
domestic rm (i.e.  = 0), the critical value " lies at around 2:7. It is worth noting this critical elasticity probably
lies well above the demand elasticity for some monopolistic services (such as water or electricity12), but it is possibly
lower than that for some goods subsectors, or particularly for goods suppliers where there is a single domestic supplier
12Although the actions of a price regulator may make these industries behave as if they had a higher demand elasticity.
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competing with a foreign competitive fringe.13 It is therefore quite conceivable that national champions in many
industries may be protected for prot-shifting reasons.
Now consider the impact of allowing  to alter, representing a rise in foreign share ownership. Simulations indicate
the following relationship:
Foreign share  Critical elasticity "
0% 2.7
5% 3.0
10% 3.6
15% 4.4
20% 5.9
25% 9.1
30% 20.0
Table 4: Relationship between foreign share and critical elasticity for protecting a domestic monopoly.
The pattern shown in Table 4 indicates that, at low share ownership levels, the marginal e¤ect of raising foreign
share ownership on the critical elasticity is not great: however, it becomes increasingly important, and once foreign
share ownership rises above 20% the curve becomes steep. In other words, at the kind of foreign share-ownership level
seen in most European countries today, the prot-shifting case for protection of a domestic monopolist breaks down
quite rapidly.
5 Further considerations
5.1 FDI and international share ownership
Dick (1993) based his estimates of the e¤ects of international ownership on US Department of Commerce estimates
for 1986 of the stock of foreign direct investment in the USA. By contrast, most of the analysis in the rst part
of my paper is based upon estimates of foreign ownership of the stock markets of various countries. Both types of
foreign investment are of relevant to the prot-shifting debate, but in di¤erent ways. FDI, in the form of complete
ownership by foreigners of a local subsidiary, is the more visible form of foreign share ownership, yet the debate over
national championsgenerally focuses on rms which appear, at rst sight, not to be foreign-owned (or at least not
13For example, a recent survey article by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) indicates that most traded goods have elasticities of
substitution between di¤erent national producers of between 5 and 10.
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primarily foreign-owned). The international share-ownership statistics from FESE indicate that, even when a rm is
not explicitly foreign-owned, a high proportion of its prots may still, in fact, end up in the hands of foreigners.
A recent mimeo paper by Ishikawa et al (2007) examines the interesting circumstances of partial FDI - in other
words, the situation where a signicant proportion of its shares is owned by a foreign rival, even if the company is still
quoted on the local stock exchange. This is undoubtedly an explanation of some cross-border share ownership (though
not all), and does introduce interesting issues of mixed motivations for the subsidiary company.14 This situation is
somewhat more complex than those analysed in this paper.
5.2 Two-way share ownership
A further complication is that, not only do foreigners own a signicant proportion, ; of shares in country 1, but
residents in country 1 may own a proportion  of shares in the rival rm based in country 2. While this is undoubtedly
a possibility, it is most relevant in the two-country case examined in Lees (1990) paper on cross-ownership. In most
cases, at least where we are looking at individual European countries, the value of  is likely to be much smaller than
that of , due to the presence of many third-party countries. However, one qualication to this comes when we are
looking at protectionism taken at the level of regional groupings or very large nations (say, the EU versus the United
States), in which case  may no longer be small. For this reason, in Appendix 2, I rework a number of the equations
in the previous sections, taking account of two-directional ownership. In general, if a proportion of the foreign rm is
owned by country 1 residents, then the protectionist motive is weakened further.
To summarise:
In the linear, Cournot model of two rms competing in a third market (section 3), there ceases to be a motive for
export subsidies when
 = (1=4)   =2: (15)
This presumably corresponds to one of the lines shown graphically in Lees (1990) gure 2. This reduces to  = (1=4)
when  = 0:
In the linear, Cournot model of using a tari¤ to protect a domestic rm against a rival (section 4.1), and conning
14Under some circumstances, in some ranges of foreign ownership, a tari¤ may cause production to shift from the foreign rm to its local
subsidiary, squeezing out properly locally-owned rms.
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ourself to the case with symmetric costs, the welfare-maximising import tari¤ is given by
t=(A  C) = (3  2   )=(9 + 2+ 4 ): (16)
For the regulatory protection setup in 4.1.2, the linear Cournot model gives us a critical threshold
10+ 8 = 3: (17)
At levels of international ownership exceeding this, assuming tari¤s are ruled out, country A will prefer to use regulatory
protection or total exclusion of the foreign rm, while at lower levels, it will not resort to regulatory protection. Again,
if  = 0; this reduces to  = 0:3:
6 Summary and Conclusions
Brander and Spencer (1981 and 1985) established the idea that prot-shifting in oligopolistic industries could be a
major motivation for protection. This was at a time when the great bulk of shares in any major countrys rms were
usually held by domestic nationals. This situation has been steadily changing in the subsequent years, as national
champion rms have been privatised and as nancial markets have become globalised. Analysis of the case of the
United States around 1989 by Dick (1993) suggested that the optimal subsidy for an American-based exporting rm
in a linear Cournot duopoly setup was roughly half what the original Brander-Spencer (1985) analysis suggested.
In this paper, I suggest that the current e¤ect of international share ownership, at least in European economies, for
which good data are available, is far greater even than Dick suggested. Analysis of European data suggests that typical
share-ownership by foreigners is now over a third in many countries, and this could well be a signicant underestimate.
Even when account is taken of corporate taxation, the share of prots accruing to foreigners is 20-30 per cent in most
countries on the lower estimate, while, on a higher estimate, taking account of indirect share ownership, it may well
be over half in many cases. In a classic duopoly setup for a third country market, this would be enough to invalidate
prot-shift on its own as a motive for export subsidy, both in a linear Cournot duopoly and (more marginally) in a
duopoly with isoelastic demand, where optimal subsidies become negative when foreign ownership exceeds 1=3 (against
1/4 in the linear case).
As a consequence of this, I look at a somewhat wider class of duopoly scenarios, to gain an idea of the likely point,
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in practice, at which the subsidising or protectionist motive will break down, as foreign share ownership rises. For
example, the use of pure horizontal regulatory protection (Maskus and Wilson, eds, 2001) to keep out a competitor to a
national champion on prot-shifting grounds is invalidated in a linear Cournot duopoly model when foreign ownership
of the domestic rm reaches 30%. With a Cournot model with isoelastic demand, based on common estimates of
demand elasticities, the critical threshold share is likely to be somewhat lower.
A consequence, at least as far as individual European countries is concerned, is that prot-shifting on its own is
no longer likely to provide an economic justication for economic patriotism. This does not mean there is no prot-
shifting,15 but prot-shifting will only justify protection at the margin when combined with other factors, such as scale
economy or general equilibrium terms-of-trade arguments. An example of this is the setting of welfare-maximising
tari¤s on a foreign competitor to a local rm (section 4.1.1 ). In this case, there is an additional motive for protection:
revenue-raising. In a linear Cournot duopoly, an increase in foreign ownership of the domestic rm would reduce the
tari¤ from 33:33% of the di¤erence between at zero foreign ownership to 25% with 30 per cent foreign ownership and
20% with half the shares owned by foreigners16 . This is the only scenario, of those examined here, where European
countries would still have a justication for protection - yet, even here, rising international share ownership means
that, year-on-year, prot-shifting is getting less important.
One caveat to this is that economic decisions are increasingly being taken at the level of regional blocs, such as
the European Union. Since some shares within EU countries are held by residents of other EU countries, the level of
non-EU ownership of EU shares will be less than that of all foreigners in the market of an individual EU country, so
weakening the international ownership e¤ect. Against this, EU residents will own a signicant proportion of shares in
many non-EU countries.
A second caveat is that governmentsor electoratesperceptions may not yet have caught up with the developments
in rm ownership. Consequently, it is quite possible that protectionist policies and economic patriotismmay survive
for some time yet, even when they make no economic sense for the countries concerned.
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1 Appendix 1: Tables
Germany* France UK Italy
Foreign investors 17.5 34.8 32.3 14.4%
Domestic investors
Collective investment 9.5 28.5 50.9 10.6%
Banks and savings banks 7.5 13.3 2.2 5.2%
Bond Issuing Mortgage companies 11.1
Others not identied 3.3%
Private Non-Financial companies 45.6 23.7 1.9 29.7%
Individual investors/households 14.1 8.5 14.9 26.6%
Public sector 5.8 4.5 0.0 10.2%
Appendix Table 1: Principal European Economies, 2003, structure of share
ownership. (*Germany 2002).
(source FESE*) Foreign % of total Foreign % of foreign+indiv+public
Slovakia 86.0 97.7
Hungary 72.6 84.6
Netherlands 69.0 84.1
Poland 53.0 88.2
Lithuania 51.8 81.7
Belgium 40.3 78.9
Australia 40.0 64.5
Portugal 38.9 70.3
Spain 35.1 57.2
France 34.8 72.8
Sweden 33.2 55.1
UK 32.3 68.4
Greece 31.3 51.2
Norway 27.8 36.9
Denmark 27.3 51.9
Japan 23.7 53.6
Germany 17.5 46.8
Italy 14.4 28.1
Slovenia 8.0 15.5
Appendix Table 2: The share of foreign ownership in various stock mar-
kets, latest (2003 for most, 2004 for Japan and Australia, 2002 for Germany).
*Sources for Australia ASX, for Japan World Federation of Exchanges.
1
Tax Lower Higher
Belgium 25.7 29.9 58.6
France 24.6 26.2 54.9
Germany 30.1 12.2 32.7
Greece 20.5 24.9 40.7
Italy 25.2 10.8 21.0
Norway 23.1 21.4 28.3
Portugal 19.7 32.1 56.5
Spain 25.9 26.0 42.3
Sweden 20.1 26.5 44.0
Netherlands 24.1 52.4 63.9
UK 23.1 24.9 52.7
Japan 29.2 16.8 37.9
Australia 25.7 29.7 47.9
Table 3: E¤ective average corporate taxation and lower and higher estimates
of the share of prots accruing abroad.
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1 Appendix 2: Cross-ownership of shares
In the main paper, I assume simply that proportion  of shares in the home
rm is owned by foreigners. However, a proportion  of shares in the foreign
competitor will be owned by inhabitants of the home country. Normally, we
would assume  < , and  may well be close to zero. However, in the case of
large nations or economic groupings, such as the United States or the European
Union,  may be large enough to be signicant. In this Appendix, I look at
the e¤ects on some of the games outlined in the main paper of allowing  to be
non-zero.
1.0.1 Two exporters to a third country market: linear Cournot
model.
To the table in the main paper, we need to add:
Prot rm 2 2 = (A  C   S)2=9b:
Welfare country 1 W 01 = (1  )1 +  2   (A  C + 2S)S=3b:
Marginal welfare e¤ect of S @W 01=@S = 4(1  )(A  C + 2S)=9b  2 (A  C   S)=9b
 (A  C   S)=3b+ 2S=3b:
Setting S = 0, we want the combination of values of  and  for which
@W 01=@S = 0 :
4(1  )(A  C)=9b  (2 + 3)(A  C)=9b = 0;
1  4  2 = 0;
 = (1=4)   =2:
1
This produces a critical threshold for values of f;  g.
1.1 Taxation of a foreign competitor.
I look at the symmetric model only.
With tari¤ t and regulatory barrier 
Firm 1 prots 1 = (A  C + t+ )2=9b:
Firm 2 prots 2 = (A  C   2t  2)(A  C + t+ )=9b:
Consumer surplus V = (2A  2C   t  )2=18b:
Tari¤ revenue T = t(A  C   2t  2)=3b:
Welfare country 1 W 01 = (1  )1 +  2 + V + T:
With  = 0 @1=@t = 2(A  C + t)=9b:
@2=@t = ( (A  C)  4t)=9b:
@V=@t =  (2A  2C   t)=9b:
@T=@t = (A  C   4t  2)=3b:
@W 01=@t = 2(A  C + t)=9b  2(A  C + t)=9b   ((A  C) + 4t)=9b  (2A  2C   t)=9b+ 3(A  C   4t)=9b;
= (1=9b)[(A  C)(2  2     2 + 3) + t(2  2  4 + 1  12)];
= (1=9b)[(A  C)(3  2   )  t(9 + 2+ 4 )];
Setting @W 01=@t = 0:
(A  C)(3  2   ) = t(9 + 2+ 4 );
t=(A  C) = (3  2   )=(9 + 2+ 4 ):
2
1.2 Total exclusion of a foreign competitor to a national
champion.
Monopoly Duopoly
Prot rm 1 1M = (A  C)2=4b 1D = (A  C)2=9b:
Prot rm 2 2D = (A  C)2=9b:
Consumer surplus VM = (A  C)2=8b VD = 2(A  C)2=9b:
Welfare W1M = (3  2)(A  C)2=8b W1D = (3  +  )(A  C)2=9b:
Country 1 is indi¤erent between letting in or excluding the foreign rm if
W1D =W1jM :
(3  +  )(A  C)2=9b = (3  2)(A  C)2=8b;
8(3  +  ) = 9(3  2);
10+ 8 = 3:
3
